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Introduction
In this lecture, I offer some thoughts on a medical/legal issue that is old,
yet perennially pertinent; that is common, yet extraordinary; that is wellknown, yet all too often swept under the carpet. I refer to the issue-or
more accurately the plethora of issues-that surround mental health and
the law.
Let me begin with a few facts that demonstrate the importance of
mental health and the law. I will start with an anecdote.
. A couple of years ago I found myself at a dinner at Rideau Hall in
honour of recipients of the Order of Canada. I was seated next to a police
officer who was in charge of the police precinct in a downtown area of
Toronto where people were poor and crime was high.
"What," I asked the officer, "is the biggest challenge you face?"
I expected him to reply that his biggest problem was the defenseoriented Charter' rulings the Supreme Court of Canada kept handing
down. But, he surprised me.
"Our biggest problem," the officer answered, "is mental illness."
My dinner companion went on to explain that a large proportion of
the people arrested and brought into his police station were not "true
criminals," but people who were mentally ill. They were people who had
committed some offence, usually minor, occasionally more major, for no
other reason than the confusion in their disordered minds.
The Right Honourable Beverley McLachlin, PC, was appointed Chief Justice of Canada on
7 January 2000. The Dr. Saul Green Memorial Lecture is in honour of Dr. Green, a graduate from
Dalhousie University's Medical School and fellow of the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons
in Canada. The lecture is presented by the University of King's College and the Shaar Shalom
Synagogue. This paper is an adaptation of the lecture given by Chief Justice McLachlin in Halifax,
Nova Scotia in October 2010. It is printed with permission of the author.
CanadianCharterofRights and Freedoms, Part I of the ConstitutionAct, 1982, being Schedule
1.
B to the CanadaAct 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
*
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Whatever the reason for these individuals' actions, the officer told me
that the ordinary police processes did not respond well to their situations:
how are the police, who are not doctors or nurses, to deal with continuing
acts of derangement? How do they read a person their rights when they
are not capable of listening to, or comprehending their situation? How do
they find them lawyers and arrange appearances before judges? In the end,
where the initiating incident is not of great consequence, often all that can
be done is to hold the mentally ill person for a few hours and then return
him to the street, where the cycle begins all over again.
We do not like to talk about mental illness, but as people like this
police officer attest, it is a huge problem.
According to a Health Canada report, approximately twenty per cent
of individuals, will experience a mental disorder of one sort or another
in the course of their lifetime. Of course, many of the remaining eighty
per cent will be indirectly affected by the mental illnesses of family
members, friends or colleagues.2 Statistics tell us that two per cent of our
population suffers from schizophrenia or bi-polar disease, and eight per
cent will experience major depression at some time in their lives. 3 The link
between individuals suffering from mental illness and their involvement
in the criminal justice system is clear; it is estimated that up to fifty per
cent of prisoners have anti-social personality disorder-often referred to
as psychopathy.4
The facts are clear. Mental health is a huge and all too common
problem. Perhaps more than any other health problem, it engages the legal
system and the general society in a host of different ways. It is a changing
problem. Mental illness is probably much as it ever was, although there
was so little study of it in past centuries that is hard to know for sure. What
has changed are two things. First, we now realize that mental illness is just
that-an illness. It is not madness, craziness, or possession of the devil,
as people thought in the past. It is a sickness. We now know that major
mental diseases, like schizophrenia, are concerned with chemistry in the
brain and how it affects the transfer of impulses across the synapses. We
now know that many major mental illnesses have a genetic component.
(Not that this in itself is new. In the past people would say things like:
"The family is crazy," or "she has bad blood lines.") We know that while
sometimes psychotherapy can. help, sufferers cannot will mental illness

2.
Health Canada, A Report on Mental Illness in Canada,(Ottawa: Health Canada Editorial Board,
2002) at 3.
Ibid at 8.
3.
Ibid at 9.
4.
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away; like cancer or heart disease, it is there. It can be managed. But it is
a stark fact at the core of the sufferer's life.
Second, along with our growing understanding of mental health, our
attitudes toward it are changing. Along with increased awareness and
knowledge has come improvement in treatment. Drugs have been developed
to control schizophrenia, bi-polar disease and chronic depression. Support
therapy has been refined. The importance of community health is better
understood. We no longer blame the person with mental illness for being
ill, as we once did. We no longer think of the person with mental illness
as less worthy, or less valuable. We no longer deal with mental illness by
locking the person with mental illness away in institutions. Or so we like
to think. The sad truth is that we still too often stigmatize people with
mental illness. We still too often fail to provide the care and treatment
and consideration they deserve as human beings. In this way, we commit
the modem equivalent of the past sins of incarceration. Notwithstanding
modem knowledge and modem treatments, we still have a long way to go
in meeting the mental health challenge.
New knowledge and attitudes. about mental health are confronting
us with new moral and legal challenges. Mental illness raises difficult
problems regarding how the criminal law system should treat people
with mental illness. In civil law, it raises thorny legal problems relating
to capacity and consent to treatment. We are confronted with how our
supposedly just society deals with the person with mental illness as
victim. One cannot delve very deeply into mental health issues without
encountering fundamental questions. When is it just to hold a person
responsible for their criminal acts? Can the law limit the right to refuse
hospitalization and medical treatment, and if so, where do the limits lie?
What rights do family and society have to impose treatment? And what
obligation do we, the supposedly mentally healthy, owe to our brothers
and sisters with mental illness?
I would like to discuss the challenge of mental health from these three
perspectives: (i) the person with mental illness and the criminal law; (ii)
the person with mental illness and the civil law; and (iii) the person with
mental illness as victim.
The problems of the present are rooted in the past. To understand the
present, we must know something of the past.
I. A look at the past
Even a brief glance at history demonstrates that mental illness, like war
and poverty, has always been part of the human condition. Yet the history
of the law does not show a parallel preoccupation with the rights and
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responsibilities of the mentally ill and of society toward them. Rather,
until the nineteenth century, mental illness was associated with evil. The
person with mental illness was said to be possessed of the devil or evil
spirits. At the very least, this person was a deviant, a substandard model
of the human species which God had chosen not to endow with normal
mental habits. Mental illness was largely a religious matter, which it was
thought the law and medicine could safely ignore. To this general pattern
of neglect there was one exception. Where the person with mental illness
was seen as a general threat, the law might be brought in to get rid of her.
The scientific revolution which began in the eighteenth century and
blossomed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries brought a new way of
looking at mental illness. The old idea that it was caused by the devil or by
God gave way to scientific inquiry into the causes of mental illness. Thus
emerged acceptance of the fact that mental aberration and malfunction
were, like physical aberration and malfunction, sicknesses. Given the
rudimentary state of brain science, pharmacology and psychiatry, usually
little could be done to alleviate the problem. The solution was to confine
the afflicted in mental institutions. It was this model that was imported to
Canada, where it remained the dominant way of treating mental illness
until the latter part of the twentieth century.
Without suggesting that care and treatment were absent, the dark
aspects of the confinement paradigm must be acknowledged. People were
sometimes confined on improper grounds. In a day before divorce was a
practical or acceptable solution to a bad marriage, it was not unknown for
sane but upset women to be confined to mental institutions under legal
orders obtained by their husbands, on the affidavit evidence of casually
convinced doctors. Indeed, one of the first cases I encountered as an
articled student in Edmonton, Alberta began with a call from the wife
of a professor at the University of Alberta who had been committed to a
mental institution by her husband. The grounds upon which she had been
committed were false and we quickly obtained an order for her release and
filed for divorce. This woman was my client for the better part of a year.
She was sane, rational, and one of the most reasonable divorce clients I
have ever encountered.
How many other women, I wondered, had been similarly confined
over the years? How many had not been lucky enough or determined
enough to free themselves?
Even when people with mental illness were properly confined,
they sometimes suffered abuse. Electric shock treatment was routinely
administered in the 1950s and 1960s. It is now seen as having often been
abusive. In the 1920s and 1930s the laws of Alberta, British Columbia and
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numerous American states provided for the forced sterilization of people
considered "mentally deficient" and had them confined to institutions.'
Some courts explicitly accepted the eugenic principles that informed
such legislation. For example, in the infamous 1927 case of Buck v. Bell,
the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of
Virginia's statute providing for the sterilization of "mental defectives." 6
In that case, Justice Holmes, an otherwise highly respected judge, wrote
these striking words: "Three generations of imbeciles are enough." 7
Once again, we see the law being used not to help people with mental
disabilities, but to oppress them.
Alberta's Sexual SterilizationAct was repealed in 1972.8 While it was
in force, some 2,800 sterilizations were performed.9 We now know that
the Sexual Sterilization Act was applied in a discriminatory manner and
that it had a disproportionate impact on disadvantaged groups including
women and people of minority ethnic backgrounds.o We also know that
the statute was not only misguided and based on faulty science, but on
many occasions sterilizations were performed without even meeting the
legislation's basic requirements.
Take, for instance, the tragic case of Leilani Muir. In 1955, when
she was ten years old, Ms. Muir was institutionalized in an Alberta
training school for the mentally deficient. Although she is a woman
of normal intelligence,. at the age of 14 she was irreversibly surgically
sterilized while told she was undergoing an appendectomy. Ms. Muir's
sterilization and the resulting inability to have children had a profound
and devastating effect on her life. In the 1990s Ms. Muir brought an action
against the government of Alberta for her improper sterilization and
institutionalization. Ms. Muir was eventually awarded a total of $740,780
in compensatory and aggravated damages by the Alberta Court of Queen's
Bench." Subsequently, the government of Alberta settled similar claims
from other victims of sterilization and made payments totaling about $142
million. 2

Sexual SterilizationAct, SA 1928, c 37; Sexual SterilizationAct, SBC 1933, c 59; see also Muir
5.
v Alberta (1996), 36 Alta LR (3d) 305, 132 DLR (4th) 695 (QB).
6.
Buck v Bell, 274 US 200 (1927).
Ibid at 207.
7.
8.
The Sexual SterilizationRepeal Act, SA 1972, c 87.
9.
Muir, supranote 5.
10. Ibid.
11. Ibid.
12. See Government of Alberta, News Release, "Stratton Agreement concludes sterilization
negotiations" (2 November 1999) online: Government of Alberta <http://www.gov.ab.cal
acn/199911/8353.html>.
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In the 1960s and 1970s, a reaction against the confinement model of
treatment for mental illness took hold. It was fuelled by public reaction
against the abuses that were coming to light. It was also abetted by a
growing understanding of the causes of various mental illnesses and their
treatment. Diseases like schizophrenia and bi-polar disorder were linked
to chemical changes in the brain, helping to dispel the lingering medieval
notion that mental illness was somehow evil. At the same time, new
medications offered hope for alleviating the symptoms of these diseases
and helping their victims to lead more normal lives.
The result was a move away from automatic institutionalization of
persons with mental illness. The enormous, secluded compounds housing
thousands of patients, conveniently tucked out of public view in the
countryside, gradually disappeared. New hospitals for the most serious
cases were constructed, often in or near urban centers. Many of the patients
formerly housed in institutions were released into society on medication.
While a necessary step, the rapid de-institutionalization of mental
health care of the 1970s and 1980s created new problems. Many newly
released patients were ill-prepared for transition into society. Frequently,
the medications had unpleasant side-effects. Lacking close supervision,
patients all too often stopped taking these medications. The result? People
with mental illness on the street, seemingly without care or hope.
We are still struggling with the problems flowing from deinstitutionalization. They are the sort of problems.that lead the police
officer I mentioned at the outset to say that persons with mental illness are
his biggest challenge. The downtown streets of our large cities are peopled
by thousands of homeless men and women, many of whom are mentally
ill. Once again, mental illness challenges the law. Whereas before the law
locked them into institutions, now it must interface with them in society.
Whereas once the legal solution to mental illness was simple, now it is
complex and difficult and what is more, expensive. Drugs cost money.
Decent housing costs money. Hospitals and psychiatrists cost money. With
so many competing demands on the public health care budget, the claims
of persons with mental illness, who still hover on the margins of society,
are too easily overlooked.
All of this impacts on the law, both criminal and civil, and the situation
of the person with mental illness as victim. Which brings me to the first of
the three perspectives I mentioned earlier.
II. The person with mental illness and the criminallaw
Generally, to find a person guilty of a crime, the prosecution must establish
two elements: (1) the criminal act; and (2) a guilty mind. The second
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requirement raises problems in the case of a crime committed under
the influence of mental illness. The person may not possess the mental
faculties necessary to find that he or she had a guilty mind. Put in broad
philosophical terms, how can the law hold a person responsible for his or
her criminal act, if the person's mental illness deprived him or her of a
functioning, deciding mind? Is not criminal responsibility and punishment
appropriate only when "the actor is a discerning moral agent, capable of
making choices between right and wrong"? 3
For many years, English criminal law, from which we derived our
criminal law, had little to say about persons with mental illness. It seems
they were treated much like ordinary accused persons. The fact that they
may have been acting under delusions or compulsions or mania provided
no defence.
In the nineteenth century, the law finally took formal note of mental
illness and the issue of whether it could provide a defence. The case, still
famous and still referred to in our courts, was M'Naghten ' Case.14 By all
accounts, Daniel M'Naghten suffered from delusions of persecution and
was mentally ill. He believed his chief persecutor to be the Prime Minister
of England, Sir Robert Peel. M'Naghten went to London with the intention
of assassinating Peel. His chosen moment was a procession. However,
the plan failed when, in the absence of Queen Victoria, Peel rode in the
royal carriage. Peel's own vehicle was occupied by his secretary Edward
Drummond. Mistaking the secretary for the Prime Minister, M'Naghten
shot and killed Drummond. M'Naghten was tried for murder, but the
jury returned a verdict of not guilty, on the ground of insanity. Although
M'Naghten spent the rest of his life in mental hospitals, the jury's verdict
caused quite an uproar in Victorian London.
In reaction to this case, the House of Lords sent a series of questions
relating to the defence of insanity to the judges of England. Lord Chief
Justice Tindal's answers to these questions on behalf of fourteen judges
are known as the M'Naghten Rules. To establish the defence of insanity,
Chief Justice Tindal said, an accused must clearly prove that "at the time
of the committing of the act, [he] was laboring under such a defect of
reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality
of the act he was doing; or if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong.""

13.
DLR
14.
15.

Winko v British Columbia (ForensicPsychiatricInstitute), [1999] 2 SCR 625 at para 31, 175
(4th) 193.
MNaghten Case, (1843), 8 ER 718 HL.
Ibidat722.
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The law in Canada has expanded the mental illness defence beyond a
merely cognitive test. Under our law, a person with mental illness will be
exempt from criminal responsibility if she is incapable of appreciatingthe
nature and quality of her actions. "Appreciating" involves more than simply
"knowing", the word used in the M'Naghten Rules. Under the Canadian
test, "[e]motional, as well as intellectual, awareness of the significance
of the conduct, is in issue."l 6 Appreciating the nature and quality of an
act involves knowledge of the physical quality of an act and an ability to
perceive its consequences, impact and results.17
This includes the ability to know that an act is "wrong" according to
the moral standards of society.I The focus is on the moral. wrongfulness
of the particular act in the perpetrator's mind. The accused must have the
intellectual ability to tell right from wrong in an abstract sense and "the
ability to apply that knowledge in a rational way to the alleged criminal
act."" Thus an accused may well appreciate that her act will result in death
and know that to kill is both illegal and morally wrong, but be unable by
reason of mental illness to apply that knowledge and hence be exempt
from criminal responsibility.
Traditionally, a successful insanity defense gave rise to a verdict of
not guilty on account of insanity. When such a verdict was rendered, the
trial judge was required to order that the person be held in strict custody
until the pleasure of the Lieutenant Governor of the province was known.
This system, commonly known as the Lieutenant Governor Warrants
system, resulted in the automatic detention of persons acquitted by reason
of insanity for a potentially indeterminate period of time, without any
hearing and irrespective of whether that person actually posed a threat to
society.2 0
In 1991, pursuant to a constitutional challenge brought by Owen Swain,
the Supreme Court of Canada held that the automatic detention of persons
acquitted by reason of insanity was unconstitutional. 2 1 Mr. Swain had been
found not guilty by reason of insanity in relation to criminal charges arising
from bizarre assaults on family members apparently committed in order
to protect them from evil spirits. Swain was detained under the Lieutenant
Governor Warrants system. Because detention was imposed automatically,
without any hearing and without the application of any standard or criteria,
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Cooper vR (1979), [1980] 1 SCR 1149 at 1160, 110 DLR (3d) 46.
Ibidat 1162.
Rv Chaulk, [1990]3 SCR 1303 at 1354, 62 CCC (3d) 193.
R v Oommen, [1994] 2 SCR 507 at 516,19 Alta LR(3d) 305.
Rv Swain, [1991] 1 SCR 933, 5 CR (4th) 253.
lbid.
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the majority of the Supreme Court held that the system infringed both the
right not to be arbitrarily detained and the right to liberty protected by the
CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms.22
In response to the Swain decision, Parliament substantially re-vamped
the Criminal Code" provisions dealing with mental illness. For example,
we no longer refer to the defense as insanity. Under the new regime, a
person may be found not criminally responsible on account of mental
disorder.24 This change in terminology recognizes that mental illness may
operate to exempt an accused person from criminal responsibility. It also
signifies that we are no longer faced with a stark choice between acquittal
and conviction of persons with mental illness.
. The law now offers a third alternative under which mentally ill offenders
are diverted into a special stream where the twin goals of protecting the
public and treating the ill offender fairly and appropriately are pursued.
The 1991 amendments also did away with the Lieutenant Governor
Warrants 25 system. Accused person's found not criminally responsibleor NCR for short-are now dealt with under Part XX. 1 of the Criminal
Code. Under the new system, we no longer presume that a person found
not criminally responsible is dangerous and must be detained. There
are now individualized and periodic assessments of the NCR accused's
circumstances. Review Boards have been set up for each province. Three
options-or dispositions-are available to a court or Review Board
examining an NCR accused's situation. First, if that person is not a
significant threat to the safety of the public, an absolute discharge must
be ordered. An absolute discharge frees the NCR accused and bring an
end to involvement in the criminal justice system. If the NCR accused
does present a significant threat, the court or Review Board must choose
between a conditional discharge or detention in a hospital. Unless and until
an absolute discharge is ordered, the NCR accused's case is examined by
the Review Board every 12 months.
22. Swain, supra note 20.
23. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
24. Ibid at s 672.34.
25. See S Hodgins et al, "Canadian Database: Patients Held on Lieutenant Governor Warrants" in
Forum on CorrectionsResearch, vol 2:3 (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 1990), online: Correctional
Service Canada <http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/forum/e023/e023b-eng.shtml> which states as
follows:
The Lieutenant Governor Warrant is employed when the accused is deemed unfit to stand
trial or is found to have been insane when the offence was committed. The majority of
patients held on warrant (nearly 90%) had been deemed not guilty by reason of insanity,
and the remaining 10% had been found unfit to stand trial. The warrant was used most often
for serious crimes, such as homicide and sexual assault. On average, the patients had been
held on warrant for six years.
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In making a disposition, the CriminalCode provides that the court or
Review Board must consider the need to protect the public from dangerous
persons, the mental condition of the accused, the accused's reintegration
into society and the other needs of the accused.26 Moreover, the Code
further provides that the disposition must be the least onerous and least
restrictive to the accused that is still consistent with public safety. 27 If
the court or Review Board is unable to positively conclude that the NCR
accused is a significant threat to public safety, an absolute discharge must
be ordered. 28
This new regime has withstood constitutional challenge. In the case
of Winko v. British Columbia (ForensicPsychiatricInstitute)the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the system respects an NCR accused's right to
liberty protected by s. 7 of the Charterand her equality rights protected by
s. 15 of the Charter.2 9 In particular, we found that the scheme interfered
with an NCR accused's liberty -no more than strictly necessary to protect
public safety.3 0 Similarly, because Parliament's new regime does not
presume dangerousness and provides for individualized assessment and
treatment, "it reflects the view that NCR accused are entitled to sensitive
care, rehabilitation and meaningful attempts to foster their participation
in the community."3 1 In this regard, the NCR system, although it may
treat mentally ill offenders differently, respects their right to substantive
equality. In short, the regime established in Part XX. 1 of the Criminal
Code appropriately balances the need to protect the public from those
persons with mental illness who are dangerous and the liberty, autonomy
and dignity interests of persons with mental illness.
One can see that the law has changed greatly in recent years in how
it treats mentally ill offenders. Arguably it is much fairer and much more
effective, geared as it is to rehabilitation. It is a flexible regime, designed
to meet the offender's needs.
A persistent problem, however, is the lack of adequate treatment
facilities. Judges complain that they cannot refer mentally ill offenders
for the assessments contemplated by the Criminal Code, due to lack of
hospital facilities. The problem is particularly acute in Ontario where
mentally ill offenders are often detained in jail while awaiting hospital beds
for a psychiatric assessment. Not infrequently this results in the detention
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Supra note 23 at s 672.54.
Ibid.
Supra note 13 at paras 47-49.
Ibid.
Ibid at para 71.
Ibid at para 90.
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of individuals accused of relatively minor offences who otherwise would
never be kept in custody. The consequences are sometimes tragic.
In November 2003, a man with a mental illness suddenly died in an
Ottawa jail while awaiting an assessment in relation to an assault that
actually had occurred while he was in the psychiatric wing of a local
general hospital. This unfortunate man was apparently charged in order to
facilitate his transfer to a specialized psychiatric hospital. Lack of hospital
beds resulted in remand to the local jail of a man who desperately needed
both physical and mental medical attention. A coroner's jury looking into
this death recently recommended that the practice of detaining persons
with mental illness in jail while awaiting assessments should end.3 2 In
another Ottawa case, a forty-five year old man with mental illness, who
was arrested on minor charges, apparently "fell through the cracks" and
was held in jail for six months without being brought to court and without
his lawyer or family members being notified."
The courts in Ontario have also weighed in on this issue. In 2003,
an application was brought before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice
by two individuals challenging the practice of detaining accused persons
in jail pending the availability of beds for psychiatric assessments. The
Court ruled that this practice was contrary to the relevant provisions of
the Criminal Code and offends the right to liberty protected by s. 7 of the
Charter and the right not to be arbitrarily detained guaranteed by s. 9 of
the Charter.3 4
In another case that demonstrates that lack of mental health resources
also affects children, charges against a mentally troubled thirteen year old
girl were stayed by an Ontario Provincial Court judge. 5 Although the Judge
had ordered an assessment in a psychiatric hospital, the young person in
this case was initially sent to a youth detention centre and held there for
fifteen days without counsel, her parents, or the court being informed.
Eventually, pursuant to further court orders, a psychiatric assessment
was conducted at a local children's hospital and completed while this
young person was in youth detention. According to Judge Dorval, lack of
appropriate facilities for persons under age sixteen meant that she received
only a cursory psychiatric assessment and was given anti-psychotic

32. Jake Rupert, "Mentally Ill Wait in Jail for Justice to be Done", Ottawa Citizen (10 November
2004). Of course, equally regrettable tragedies may occur in a psychiatric hospital setting: see Harold
Levy, "Is the Law Fair When Mental Patients Die?", Toronto Star (7 February 2005).
33. Rupert, supranote 32; see also Jake Rupert, "He Doesn't Look Like the Person I Knew", Ottawa
Citizen (4 June 2004).
34. R v Hussein (2004), 191 CCC (3d) 113 at para 33, 26 CR (6th) 368 (Ont Sup Ct J).
35. R v SM(2004), 61 WCB (2d) 63 at paras 30-31, [2004] OJ no 1007 (Ct J).
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medication, not for medical reasons, but simply to control her difficult
behavior. In Judge Dorval's view, this was differential treatment based on
age and an infringement of the young person's equality rights under s. 15
of the Charter.
Cases like this demonstrate both the existence of a resource deficit,
and that this problem potentially impacts on the constitutionally protected
rights of individuals involved in the criminal justice system.
Governments, however, must be given credit for recognizing these
difficulties and seeking to address them. One response has been the
development of specialized courts, including mental health courts. These
courts provide an alternative to criminal prosecution by diverting accused
with mental health problems to treatment programs in the community. As
Brian Lennox, Chief Justice of the Ontario Court of Justice, said at the
opening of the Mental Health Court in Ottawa:
The Ottawa Mental Health Court is an example of a progressive
movement within criminal justice systems in North America and
elsewhere in the world to create "problem-solving courts." These
courts, with collaborative interdisciplinary teams of professionals and
community agencies, attempt to identify and to deal with some of the
underlying factors contributing to criminal activity,.which have often not
been very well-addressed by the conventional criminal justice process.
The goal is to satisfy the traditional criminal law function of protection
of the public by addressing in individual cases the real rather than the
apparent causes that lead to conflict with the law. 6
Mental health courts have opened in Ontario, New Brunswick and
Newfoundland." Many other jurisdictions, including British Columbia,
Manitoba, Nunavut and Yukon, are in various stages of developing these
courts. Because mental health courts are a recent phenomenon, there is
little data that can be used to assess their success. Nonetheless, a 2006
evaluation of the Brooklyn Mental Health Court indicated significant
improvements in several outcome measures, including substance abuse,
psychiatric hospitalizations, homelessness and recidivism.38 Anecdotal
evidence from judges I have spoken to also indicates that these courts do
much to alleviate the problems.

36. Mark Rieksts, "Mental Health Courts in Canada" Law Now 33:2 (November/December 2008) 1
at 2.
37. Ibid.
38. Kelly O'Keefe, The Brooklyn Mental Health Court Evaluation: Planning, Implementation,
Courtroom Dynamics, and ParticipantOutcomes, (New York: Center for Court Innovation, 2006)
online: < http://courtinnovation.org/_uploads/documents/BMHCevaluation.pdf>.

Medicine and the Law: The Challenges of Mental Illness

27

At the same time, the struggle for adequate facilities for people with
mental illness under detention orders continues. The situation of persons
with mental illness involved in each province's criminal justice system is
being addressed, but still haltingly.
III. The person with mental illness and the civil law
Issues raised by mental illness are not limited to the criminal law. Difficult
ethical and legal problems also arise in the civil justice system. When
can a person with a mental illness be forcibly hospitalized? When can
people with mental illness be forced to take medication? These questions
engage vital yet conflicting interests. On the one hand lies the liberty of
the individual and the right of the individual to make decisions concerning
his treatment. On the other lies the tragic reality that people with mental
illness often cannot, because of their illness, rationally make the decisions
which may be to their benefit. Surely, their loved ones argue, we should be
able to impose treatment at least to the point where they are restored and
have the capacity to make a rational decision for themselves.
The controversy is rooted in a bleak past. I mentioned earlier the
case of my perfectly sane client whose husband had her committed to a
mental institution, from which she escaped only by perseverance and dint
of the law. Victorian literature is rife with similar tales. Too often family
members, frustrated by behavior they found to be difficult, solved the
problem by swearing a declaration that their wife, child, mother, or father
was "incompetent," as the law put it. The result was that the person was
taken away to a mental institution, where, barring intervention, they might
languish indeterminably.
This still may happen, where the person with a mental illness poses a
danger to himself or to society. Sometimes the issue is not committal to a
facility but whether the person may be forced to take treatment-usually
drugs-to help restore him or her to sanity. In either case, the situation
puts conflicting goals in play. Where the issue is committal, the conflict is
between the freedom of a person with a mental illness, on the one hand, and
the need to protect society or the ill person himself from harm, on the other.
Sometimes, suicide may be likely if the person is let be. Where the issue is
therapy, the conflict is between the ill person's freedom on the one hand,
and the desire to restore the patient to an unclouded mental state where
he or she is in a position to make a rational choice as to whether to accept
treatment, on the other. In practice, the two issues often intertwine.
Committal to a hospital must be approached with great caution.
Historically, the criterion for forcible admission to hospital of persons
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with mental illness was simply the need for treatment.39 In the late
1970s, provincial legislatures began to replace the need for treatment
criterion with one that permitted involuntary hospitalization based only
on dangerousness. Now all Canadian jurisdictions permit the involuntary
hospitalization of persons who present a danger to themselves or others.4 0
Still, the test varies. In some provinces the danger must be of physical
or bodily harm. In others, a broader notion of danger is used and the risk
of serious mental, emotional, social or even financial harm may justify
forced hospitalization. The medical profession takes this responsibility
very seriously, aware as they are of the right of each person, absent clear
justification, to be free-a right grounded in the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms. When committal is necessary, the aim is to use the
period of containment for treatment, with a view to releasing the patient
as quickly as possible.
Many of the controversies in recent years have focused not on
committal, but on mandatory medical treatment of a person who has
been committed to hospital either under Part XX. 1 of the Criminal Code,
which I just described, or under the civil committal process of a province.
The issue in such cases is whether the person with mental illness has the
capacity to know and weigh the facts relevant to the decision to refuse or
accept medication and other therapies.
The dilemma at the heart of such cases is dramatically illustrated by a
case in our Court, known popularly as the Starson case.41 Scott Starsonor Professor Starson as he calls himself-is an exceptionally intelligent
and unique person. Although not formally trained in physics, in the past
he had achieved substantial accomplishments in this field and received
recognition from some members of the academic community. He had
published several papers and a Stanford University Professor had even
described his thinking as ten years ahead of its time.
However, Professor Starson is also mentally ill, resulting in delusions.
For instance, he believed that he was on the leading edge of efforts to build
a starship, claimed to be a world-class skier and arm wrestler, insisted
that he was the greatest scientist in the world, and professed to be in
communication with aliens. Professor Starson's illness had also resulted in
threatening and aggressive behavior that caused conflict with the criminal
justice system. At the time of the Starson case, he was being detained in a

39. John E Gray, Margaret Ann Shone & Peter F Little, Canadian Mental Health Law and Policy
(Toronto: Butterworths, 2000) at 99.
40. Ibid at 115ff.
41. Starson v Swayze, 2003 SCC 32, [2003] 1 SCR 722.
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psychiatric hospital, as a result of a verdict of not criminally responsible
flowing from charges of uttering death threats against his neighbours.
Professor Starson's physicians believed that medication would likely
restore his health and prevent further deterioration. However, Professor
Starson objected to medication of any form, claiming that it dulled his
thinking and prevented him from working on his scientific pursuits.
Professor Starson's psychiatrist found that he was not capable of making
a decision with respect to the proposed treatment and should be forced,
pursuant to Ontario's Health Care Consent Act, 1996, to take medication
needed to prevent further deterioration of his condition.42 Professor Starson
applied to Ontario's Consent and Capacity Board to review that decision.
The Board confirmed the psychiatrist's finding of incapacity. According to
the Board, Professor Starson was in almost total denial of his illness, and
that without an acknowledgment of illness, he could not relate treatment
information. to his own particular disorder. He could not understand the
consequences of a decision to either refuse or consent to medication, or
appreciate the risks and benefits of a treatment decision.
The matter went to court, and the Board's decision was reversed.
The issue was whether the Board's decision to compel treatment was
reasonable. The Ontario Health Care ConsentAct provides that all persons
are presumptively capable of making treatment decisions. A finding of
incapacity requires evidence that the person does not have the cognitive
ability to process, retain, and understand information relevant to making
a decision about treatment, or to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of such a decision.4 3 In other words, a capable patient
must be able to understand the relevant information, apply it to his or her
personal circumstances, and weigh the foreseeable risks and benefits of a
decision or lack of decision.
The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Board
had misapplied the legal test for capacity by improperly allowing its view
of Professor Starson's best interests to influence its decision. Professor
Starson understood that his brain did not function normally, and that the
proposed treatment would have a normalizing effect. This, it held, satisfied
the decision making requirements of the Act, entitling Professor Starson to
refuse medication. The dissent would have upheld the Board's decision on
the ground that the evidence supported its view that while Dr. Starson had
the ability to understand that he was ill, his mental delusions prevented
him from properly weighing the consequences of refusing treatment.
42. Health Care ConsentAct, 1996, SO 1996, c 2, Schedule A, art 4.
43. Starson, supra note 41 at paras 12 and 13.
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Unfortunately, the story does not end here. After the Supreme Court's
decision in 2003, with Professor Starson's mental health untreated, his
condition, both mental and physical, quickly deteriorated. In 2005, his
treating physician and the Ontario Consent and Capacity Board found him
to be incapable with respect to treatment with anti-psychotic medication.
With his mother providing substitute consent, doctors began medicating
him. By 2007, his condition had improved to the point where he could be
discharged to out-patient status. Nonetheless, Professor Starson continues
to contest the finding of incapacity with respect to treatment."
Professor Starson's case illustrates the difficult choices that may arise
in the context of treating the mentally ill-the conflict between the liberty
of the patient to decide his fate and the desire of physicians and loved
ones to see him rehabilitated. The paradox is cruel-freedom to refuse
"medication" may in fact result in institutional confinement and continued
debilitation.
The law governing involuntary hospitalization and involuntary
treatment must balance the autonomy of the patient against conflicting
concerns in a way that is respectful of the dignity and needs of people with
mental illness. Currently, the balance pivots on degree of dangerousness.
Absent danger of harm, liberty must be accorded. However, the debate
continues. Some contend that the law should never permit mandatory
hospitalization or treatment-the absolute liberty view. Others contend
that the powers to force hospitalization and treatment should be broader,
arguing that the liberty to make irrational choices dictated by illness is no
liberty at all. Canadian law now strikes an intermediate position-liberty
can be curtailed only exceptionally. It can be curtailed where the person
with mental illness poses a risk of harm to himself or to others, or where
she is shown to lack the capacity to understand and to weigh the factors at
play in deciding whether to reject treatment.

IV. The person with mental illness as victim
Recently an editorial was published in the Toronto Star entitled "System
Fails Mentally Ill" and is as follows:
It goes without saying that no one should lose his life over a few stolen
lemons. But our health and corrections system failed 28-year-old Byron
DeBassige long before his fateful confrontation with police in a Toronto
park on Feb. 16, 2008.
He was a schizophrenic who had quit taking his medication; he was
having difficulty at his supportive housing facility; and police had picked
44. Starson v Pearce,2009 CanLil 46, [2009] OJ no 21 (Sup Ct J).
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him up for sniffing glue. But his probation officer, who might have helped
him, didn't know about any of this.
Then DeBassige stole two lemons. He was shot and killed by police after
they confronted him and he refused to drop his knife.
The coroner's inquest into his death released its recommendations last
week; all 15 focus on improving communication and coordination
between agencies, expanding access to mental health services, and
reviewing existing laws and policies to determine if they are adequate to
help the mentally ill when they are in crisis.
DeBassige is not the first mentally-ill man brandishing a weapon who
has been shot by Toronto police. There have been at least nine similar
cases in the last two decades. As a result of inquests into those cases,
improvements in police training and practice have been made.
But, as these latest recommendations make clear, much more must be
done to provide the necessary services so that those suffering from
mental illness don't get into a confrontation with the police in the first

place. 45

Earlier in this lecture, we focused on the person with mental illness
accused of a crime, and the person with mental illness as candidate for
forcible hospitalization and treatment. In this, the concluding part of my
lecture, I would like to shift the focus to millions of people with mental
illness who do not break the criminal law, and who remain untreated and
at liberty. Too often, they are simply victims-victims of discrimination,
ignorance, societal inefficiency and sometimes, as in the tragic case of
Byron DeBassige, of violence-violence that too often results in their
death.
Section 15 of the CharterofRights andFreedoms,as well as the human
rights codes in force in every province and territory, guarantee freedom
from discrimination on the basis of disability. Mental illness is a disability.
It is not a sin, nor a moral wrong; it is just a disability. Yet, persons with
mental illness are routinely the objects of discrimination. Discrimination
means treating another human being as less worthy on the basis not of
their actual merits, but on the basis of stereotypical beliefs, conscious or
unconscious, that the person is less able, or less deserving. The stark truth
is that too often we discriminate against people with mental illness. We
pass them lying on the street, but ignore pleas for better housing for people
with mental illness. We care less about research into mental illness than
into other illnesses. We are reluctant to give people with mental illness
45.
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jobs, even when they have struggled valiantly to conquer their illness.
The stigma, fear, and concern persist. And so, we continue to marginalize
them.
Discrimination is grounded in ignorance. If the police had realized that
Byron DeBassige was ill, they would not have shot him. Had his probation
officer, who might have helped him, been aware of his situation, the story
might have ended differently. We need to know more and talk more and
more openly about mental illness, if we are to avoid the spectre of the
persons with mental illness as victims.
Related to both discrimination and ignorance is lack of social
coordination on behalf of the people with mental illness. Hospitals, police,
probation officers-all who play a role in a particular person's life-must
find ways to communicate, to talk to each other. Too often, the people
with mental illness fall through the cracks of the social system that ought
to be helping them. As the editorial states, we need better communication
and co-ordination between agencies if we are to prevent more people with
mental illness from becoming victims.
Conclusion
The legal, moral, and ethical issues for criminal and civil justice raised by
mental illness are enormously difficult and complex. They are far from
being solved and we will continue to grapple with them for the foreseeable
future. Nevertheless, we can say this: great progress in .the treatment of
persons with mental illness has been made in both medicine and law.
Because of advances in medicine, we no longer view persons with
mental illness as evil, sinful, or possessed. We know that they are not
deserving of punishment. And, we know that persons with mental illness
may be successfully treated. As a result, we no longer ignore their needs
by simply removing them from view and leaving them to their unfortunate
plight.
Advances in medicine have helped dispel assumptions based on
ignorance and prejudice. For instance, we now realize that most persons
with mental illness are not dangerous. The law has incorporated this
realization by abandoning the presumption of dangerousness reflected in
the old Lieutenant Governor Warrants system. The law now treats mentally
ill offenders in a more appropriate manner and does not provide for their
automatic and arbitrary detention. Instead, we have adopted a system that
accords mentally ill offenders as much freedom as is consonant with public
safety. Likewise, our law governing hospitalization and consent continues
to grapple with the challenges of appropriately balancing the autonomy and
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dignity of persons with mental illness with their right to treatment and the
important objective of protecting the public from dangerous individuals.
There is much left to do. Science is a long way from unlocking all of
the mysteries of mental illness. There remains much to learn about causes
and possible courses of treatment. Uncovering these secrets is an important
challenge for medicine. The challenge for the law is to keep pace with
medical developments and ensure that the legal regime governing persons
with mental illness is responsive to the current state of scientific knowledge.
Our common challenge as doctors, lawyers, and judges is to work together
in addressing the problems posed by mental illness. Laws cannot heal
people, only services and treatment provided by medical professionals can
achieve that ultimate goal. But the law can create a social and regulatory
environment that assists medical professionals in delivering their services
in a manner that is both ethical and respectful of the rights and needs of
persons with mental illness.

